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Detecting task-relevant changes in a visual scene is necessary for successfully monitoring and managing dynamic
command and control situations. Change blindness—the failure to notice visual changes—is an important source
of human error. Change History EXplicit (CHEX) is a tool developed to aid change detection and maintain situation
awareness; and in the current study we test the generality of its ability to facilitate the detection of changes when
this subtask is embedded within a broader dynamic decision-making task. A multitasking air-warfare simulation
required participants to perform radar-based subtasks, for which change detection was a necessary aspect of the
higher-order goal of protecting one’s own ship. In this task, however, CHEX rendered the operator even more
vulnerable to attentional failures in change detection and increased perceived workload. Such support was only
effective when participants performed a change detection task without concurrent subtasks. Results are interpreted
in terms of the NSEEV model of attention behavior (Steelman, McCarley, & Wickens, Hum. Factors 53:142–153, 2011;
J. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 19:403–419, 2013), and suggest that decision aids for use in multitasking contexts must be
designed to fit within the available workload capacity of the user so that they may truly augment cognition.
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Detecting changes in our visual environment is essential
to several everyday activities (e.g. driving a car), as well as
in safety-critical work settings such as air traffic control
and security surveillance. Change blindness—the incap-
acity to notice visual changes—can negatively impact
decision-making and lead to important consequences such
as human errors, critical incidents, and, in worse cases,
loss of human lives. This current study intends to broaden
our understanding of the sources of change blindness and
finds that while some changes may go unnoticed because
they are never looked at, participants within a complex
environment may also be “blind” to changes/events upon
which they are fixating. In a multitasking context, atten-
tion is stretched and necessarily divided among several
subtasks, leaving fewer attentional resources to ensure
that a change—although fixated—actually reaches con-
scious awareness. While change detection support tools* Correspondence: benoit.roberge-vallieres.1@ulaval.ca;
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attentional capacity of the user. We demonstrate that one
tool (a change history table) designed to improve detec-
tion performance within an air traffic control simulated
environment, actually worsens detection performance—
perhaps due to an increase in workload and subsequently
stretched attentional resources that render the changes
less likely to be consciously detected. This indicates the
importance of testing potential support tools within a
dynamic and demanding environment to determine the
extent to which they are actually able to improve
performance.Background
The ability to discern pertinent objects and events in
our environment is essential to a multitude of everyday
activities, such as driving and air traffic control (St. John,
Smallman, & Manes, 2005). A driver, for example, must
constantly monitor the unfolding dynamic visual scene
for incoming traffic and changing road signs in order to
drive safely and avoid hazards (Horswill & McKenna,
2004). The failure to detect task-relevant changes in ais distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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Rensink, Regan, & Clark, 1997), is the source of many
human errors; in complex and dynamic situations, in
particular, the high volume of information to monitor
can overload the operator leaving critical incidents un-
noticed and in turn reduce decision-making quality
(Durlach, 2004; Varakin, Levin, & Fidler, 2004). Graph-
ical user interface add-ons and tools, such as the Change
History EXplicit (CHEX; see Smallman & St. John,
2003), have been designed to support change detection,
situation awareness and decision-making in such de-
manding situations. In the current paper, we test
whether the efficacy of CHEX, as designed by Smallman
and St. John (2003), can generalize to a dynamic and
multitasking context, aiming to extend its use beyond
the change-detection-only task environment in which it
was originally developed. Using a cognitive and holistic
approach will enable us to assess the impact of this type
of tool on all the aspects of the wider task environment
(including change detection performance) and to further
investigate the sources of attentional failures in dynamic
situations.
The ability to detect a change depends on attentional
and memory processes and the efficiency of the visual sys-
tem to capture visual transients associated with the transi-
tion between the pre-change and the post-change states of
an object. When the visual system fails to localize such
transients, CB is likely to occur (e.g. Simons, Franconeri,
& Reimer, 2000). In static visual scenes, techniques such
as the flicker, the mud-splash, and the saccade-contingent
paradigms have been used to prevent the visual system
from capturing these transient signals and thus induce CB
(e.g. Henderson & Hollingworth, 2003; O’Regan, Rensink,
& Clark, 1999; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons & Ambinder,
2005). CB has also been studied using dynamic visual
scenes in more realistic contexts, such as simulated com-
mand and control (C2), security surveillance environ-
ments, and monitoring geospatial displays (e.g. DiVita,
Obermayer, Nugent, & Linville, 2004; Durlach & Chen,
2003; Durlach, Kring, & Bowens, 2008; Stelzer & Wickens,
2006). In complex and dynamic situations, multiple
independent objects in the scene are changing frequently,
unpredictably, and sometimes simultaneously, making im-
portant visual changes difficult to process and detect
(Durlach et al., 2008). For example, in one simulated en-
vironment, participants were asked to monitor the geospa-
tial display of an airspace and to detect and identify
significant changes (e.g. new aircraft appearing on the
display). They missed about 13% of all critical changes
(St. John, Smallman, Manes, Feher, & Morrison, 2005). In
such dynamic visual scenes, transient signals are naturally
less detectable than in static scenes given that numerous
features in the scene are moving (hence constantly chan-
ging) and can act as distractors (Boot, Kramer, Becic,Wiegmann, & Kubose, 2006). Competition between task-
irrelevant transients made by distractors and those produced
by goal-relevant changes reduce the detectability of critical
changes (Vachon, Vallières, Jones, & Tremblay, 2012).
Given that change detection relies on a comparison
between the operator’s perception of the current situ-
ation and their representation of the past situation, sup-
port tools to supplement the operator’s limited memory
and attentional capacity should improve the ability to
notice these changes. One such tool is CHEX (Smallman
& St. John, 2003), a tool developed within the context of
an air-warfare task to aid participants in discriminating
significant changes from irrelevant changes that occur in
an airspace. CHEX automatically detects and logs all
changes in an interactive table positioned next to the
radar display, thus providing an external aid and a “sec-
ond chance” to notice an important change that may
have previously gone unnoticed. Each row of the table
displays the time the change occurred, the identity of
the aircraft concerned, and a brief description of the
change, while each column can be filtered by the user as
needed. Selecting a row highlights that row, circles the
location of the related aircraft on the geospatial display,
and highlights other changes in the table made by the
same aircraft, and vice versa (dynamic visual linking;
see St. John & Smallman, 2008). The CHEX permanent
repository is an uninterrupted display of situational
changes intended to help operators in recovering from
situation awareness breakdowns caused by interrup-
tions and multitasking. Situation awareness is the
perception of events, the comprehension of their
meaning, and the anticipation of their status with re-
spect to time and space (Endsley, 1995). The CHEX
display has been applied to complex dynamic situa-
tions known to require multitasking and high atten-
tional load (e.g. unmanned vehicle control; St. John &
Smallman, 2008; Parasuraman, Cosenzo, & De Visser,
2009; Vachon et al., 2012).
St. John et al. (2005) compared CHEX with four other
tools designed principally to attract attention towards
significant events in the dynamic visual scene: a static
table that chronologically listed the time and nature of
each significant change; two types of instant replay; and
explicit markers with “pop” sounds to accompany
changes. The participants’ only task was to monitor the
airspace and to explicitly declare (i.e. detect and identify)
all relevant changes as quickly as possible. Results dem-
onstrated that participants using CHEX were faster and
more accurate to detect significant changes and made
fewer omissions or errors than when using any other
tool. The authors concluded that CHEX was superior to
other tools as it supported both the detection and the
identification components of the participants’ task.
Indeed, one utility of this type of CHEX over the other
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what were the changes in the situation, it gives information
about what has changed. For example, explicit markers
only aided the detection component and participants had
to rely on their memory to infer what had happened based
upon contextual cues, whereas changes were unobtrusively
notified and described in the CHEX table. Indeed, the table
format of CHEX appears to provide a good trade-off be-
tween information accessibility and distraction by present-
ing all changes textually in a permanent log, but by not
presenting additional change-related information on the
already cluttered geo-spatial plot. CHEX thus seems a very
useful support tool for detecting changes within a dynam-
ically changing visual scene and could potentially be used
to reduce CB in complex C2 environments.
The current paper aims to extend the use of CHEX be-
yond the change-detection-only task environment in
which it was originally developed (see Smallman & St.
John, 2003; St. John et al., 2005), to a more ecologically
valid context that mimics the multitasking nature of real
C2 operations (see Vachon et al., 2012). The objective is to
test the general efficacy of the CHEX situation awareness
tool to work settings that are the most likely to require
such support systems. In this study, the CHEX serves as a
change-detection external aid. Although change detection
is a central part of many C2 tasks, it is generally only one
of several concurrent subtasks. As such, limited cognitive
resources needed for noticing these dynamic changes are
even more stretched in these circumstances, as various
other aspects of the work are also attention demanding
(Parasuraman et al., 2009). Another difference between
lab studies of CB, as well as the studies of St. John, et al.
(2005; Smallman & St. John, 2003), is that C2 operators
rarely need to declare changes explicitly on their displays
for the purpose of their mission; change detection is as-
sumed when, after a task-relevant change, an appropriate
action is taken (Vachon et al., 2012). Little research has
been conducted regarding the extent and prevention of
CB in multitasking C2 environments whereby change de-
tection is embedded within the higher-order task of the
operator (DiVita et al., 2004; Liebhaber & Feher, 2002). In
the present study, we use a simulated naval air-warfare
task, whereby participants play the role of a radar operator
who must detect (and act upon) critical situational
changes while also performing a threat-evaluation and
weapon-assignment (TEWA) task. Change detection is
thus an important subcomponent of the mission’s goals,
but it is embedded within a broader dynamic decision-
making task. CHEX has proven useful in a number of
studies in which change detection was the only task to
perform, but for it to be considered a beneficial change
detection tool for C2, it must first be validated within the
kind of high tempo, multitasking environment that would
likely require such a support system.In our assessment of the impact of decision support
on change detection, we seek to discriminate between
two different sources of CB: changes missed because
they were never attended and changes that were proc-
essed to a certain extent but go unnoticed because of a
failure of attentional processes (Vachon et al., 2012).
More precisely, the pre-attentive source of CB refers to
the idea that unattended changes—i.e. those that are
never looked at—are less likely to be consciously per-
ceived, hence more likely to remain undetected; i.e. the
change was not perceived (e.g. Rensink et al., 1997;
Simons & Ambinder, 2005). The attentional source of
CB arises when a change is attended at a time when at-
tentional processes are overloaded with many other
sources of information to process, leaving insufficient re-
sources for the change to reach consciousness. This fail-
ure to detect corresponds to looking at the change
without seeing it (e.g. Caplovitz, Fendrich, & Hughes,
2008; Drew, Võ, & Wolfe, 2013; O’Regan, Deubel, Clark,
& Rensink, 2000), although in the absence of conscious
awareness, this change may be registered implicitly
(Beck, Peterson, & Angeline, 2007; Fernandez-Duque &
Thornton, 2003). Vachon et al. (2012) provided psy-
chophysiological evidence that fixated changes that
remained undetected were nevertheless processed up to
a certain level, probably reflecting a (unanswered) call
for attention generated by the automatic detection of
attended visual transients. Here we broaden the defin-
ition of the attentional source of CB to include the
memory processes, comprehension (sense-making), and
decision-making necessary for change detection. Atten-
tion serves as a supervisory control for different cogni-
tive functions (including those involved in change
detection; see Baddeley, 1993), by overseeing compari-
sons between the pre-change and post-change represen-
tations stored in memory, the comprehension of the
change (awareness of the evolution of the situation), and
the decision-making needed to act upon the change (see
Lamme, 2003). A change that is not consciously detected
may be due to a breakdown at any of these stages, i.e. a
lack of attentional resources to either (and among
others) enable the encoding of fixated elements, make
comparisons in memory, or understand the change that
occurred in the situation (Caplovitz et al., 2008).
Considering the distinction between the two sources
of CB, we suggest that CHEX has the potential to be a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, if participants
miss a change because they were attending elsewhere
and did not fixate on it (the pre-attentive source of CB),
CHEX provides another means to detect that change as
information relating to it is displayed in a permanent and
dynamically linked table. On the other hand, providing an
additional source of visual information to monitor could
increase cognitive load detrimentally, particularly if
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acity given the nature of the tasks. As such, this could in-
crease the risk of attentional breakdown and exacerbate
the second source of CB.
The present study
The task used was the Simulated Combat Control
System microworld (S-CCS; Lafond et al., 2009; Vachon
et al., 2012), a simulation of the essential subset of cog-
nitive activities performed by tactical coordinators
aboard Canadian navy frigates. The use of a microworld
represents the best compromise between internal and
ecological validities; it provides a high degree of experi-
mental control while allowing the re-creation of displays
and scenarios that are functionally comparable to those
encountered in real C2 operations (Brehmer & Dörner,
1993; Elliot et al., 2004). For Experiment 1, participants
were required to perform TEWA processes while also
being alert and responding to unexpected critical
changes (i.e. an aircraft changing from a non-threatening
to a threatening status) which could potentially com-
promise the safety of the own ship. The TEWA task in-
volved categorizing aircraft appearing on a radar display
according to their threat level (threat evaluation) and
scheduling retaliatory actions against threatening aircraft
(weapon assignment). Participants were required to de-
tect the critical changes as part of the higher-order goal
of ensuring that aircraft were categorized appropriately
and defending the own ship.
In Experiment 1, change detection was embedded
within the TEWA task; participants were not required to
explicitly report the changes occurring, but detection of
these changes would enable performance of a timely ac-
tion to protect the own ship. Smallman and St. John’s
(2003) CHEX tool was reproduced and integrated within
the S-CCS interface and evaluated according to a holistic
approach: the efficiency of this decision support system
(DSS) included not only its effects on the function it was
designed to support—here, change detection—but also
on other cognitive functions such as categorization and
scheduling (see Lafond, Vachon, Rousseau, & Tremblay,
2010; Vachon, Lafond, Vallieres, Rousseau, & Tremblay,
2011). In this manner, the efficiency of CHEX was deter-
mined by its level of CB prevention, as well as by its
impact—positive or negative—on threat evaluation per-
formance, defensive effectiveness, and perceived workload.
Experiment 2 again used the S-CCS microworld, but this
time participants performed an explicit change detection
task (akin to that of Smallman & St. John, 2003; see also
St. John et al., 2005b), rather than the TEWA task in
which change detection is implicitly required. The same
version of the CHEX used in Experiment 1 was im-
plemented within the S-CCS interface for Experiment 2.
This second experiment served to replicate the conditionsin which the CHEX had previously proven effective,
but within the same air-warfare simulation used in
Experiment 1.
Along with determining the efficacy of CHEX to im-
prove overall change-detection performance, we mea-
sured the contribution of the DSS to prevent or reduce
the two sources of CB by further subdividing the per-
centage of undetected changes according to whether
they were fixated or not (see Vachon et al., 2012). Non-
fixated (i.e. unattended) undetected changes are in-
dicative of the pre-attentive CB—the failure to direct
attention towards the change—whereas fixated (i.e.
attended) undetected changes would reveal the occur-
rence of the second source of CB—insufficient amount
of attentional resources to consciously detect a change.
We also examined how CHEX was used by partici-
pants through actions on the tool as well as the monitor-
ing and recording of eye movements (e.g. Morrison,
Marshall, Kelly, & Moore, 1997; Poole & Ball, 2006). In
order to make a usage analysis of the tool, the display
was divided into a number of discrete areas of interest
(AOIs). Figure 1 illustrates the three AOIs defined in the
original S-CCS display, while a fourth AOI was created
when CHEX was available on the interface (see Fig. 2).
This allowed us to compare the number of aircraft selec-
tions made using the tool to those made on the radar.
We also extracted metrics related to the attention dis-
tribution over the display based on eye movements. In-
deed, there is evidence that the overt eye movements to
a given location are typically preceded by a displace-
ment of visual selective attention to that location (e.g.
McCarley & Kramer, 2008; Rayner, 2009). Hence, the
overall dwell time—the sum of all gaze fixation dura-
tions within an AOI—as well as the percentage of fixa-
tions on the DSS were taken as indicators of attention
allocation over the tool (Hauland, 2003). Greater dwell
times and percentages of fixation would be indicative of
greater devotion of attentional resources to a region of
the interface.
Finally, we assessed participants’ subjective level of
mental workload according to CHEX and control con-
ditions using the NASA-TLX questionnaire (Hart &
Staveland, 1988), a multidimensional rating procedure
that produces an overall workload score based on a
weighted average of ratings on six subscales. For the
purpose of the present study, we focused exclusively
on the mental demands and temporal demands sub-
scales, examining the perceived mental load and time
pressure in relation to change detection and TEWA
performance.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested the efficacy of the CHEX tool, as it
was designed by Smallman and St. John (2003), when
Fig. 1 S-CCS interface for the control condition of Experiment 1. Three areas of interest are defined here: (1) aircraft parameter list, (2) radar
screen, and (3) action buttons
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broader context of a TEWA task. Based on the method
of Vachon et al. (2012), we created a between-subjects
experimental design in which we compared the results
on change detection, subjective mental workload, and
TEWA performance of two groups of participants: a
group who performed the task with CHEX and another
group with no DSS.Method
Participants
Fifty-one students at Université Laval (26 men; mean age,
23.04 years), were randomly assigned to either the CHEX
(25 participants) or control condition (26 participants). All
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and re-
ceived $20 compensation for their participation in a single
2-h experimental session. This study was approved by the
Université Laval ethics committee and consent to publish
has been obtained from participants.Microworld
The S-CCS simulation (Lafond et al., 2009; Vachon et al.,
2012) is dynamic insofar as it evolves according to different
scenarios in interaction with the participants’ actions. Sce-
narios involve multiple aircraft moving in the vicinity of
the ship and some of them may represent a potential threat
to the frigate. As a tactical coordinator, participants must
perform categorization and prioritization of threats, plan
and schedule the application of combat power through re-
taliatory missile firing, and be alert to any changes made by
aircraft in the operational space.The visual display of S-CCS in the control condition
can be divided into three sections (see Fig. 1): the radar
screen (Area 1), the parameter list (Area 2), and the action
buttons (Area 3). The interface is 1024 pixels wide by
768 pixels high which corresponds to the computer moni-
tor resolution. The radar screen visually represents aircraft
that move in real time in the ship’s immediate environ-
ment with various speeds and directions. Each unselected
aircraft is represented as a white dot surrounded by a
green square. Participants left-click with the mouse on its
icon to select an aircraft. As an aircraft selection visual
feedback, the surrounding square turns red to indicate
that aircraft is now selected. The parameters list displays
information related to the selected aircraft. The action
buttons allow participants to assign threat level and im-
mediacy and to neutralize a target aircraft.
Task
The participants’ task included four subtasks to be
performed concurrently throughout the entire scenario:
(1) threat-level assessment, (2) threat-immediacy assess-
ment, (3) neutralization of hostile aircraft, and (4) crit-
ical change detection. First, participants were asked to
classify all aircraft as they progressively appeared on the
radar screen according to three threat levels (non-hos-
tile, uncertain, and hostile). To do so, they had to follow
a pre-set classification rule by taking into account five
equally weighted parameters displayed in the list: Origin,
Altitude, Identification Friend-or-Foe, Military Elec-
tronic Emissions, and Detection of Weapons. As each of
these parameters could take either a threatening or a
non-threatening value, the number of threatening cues
Fig. 2 S-CCS interface for the CHEX condition of Experiment 1. CHEX is located to the right of the radar screen
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(1) non-hostile when 0–1 of his critical parameters were
threatening, (2) uncertain when it showed 2–3 threaten-
ing cues, or (3) hostile when 4–5 of its critical parame-
ters were threatening. Participants clicked on the
corresponding classification button to register their deci-
sion, changing the aircraft’s white dot to one of three
colors: red for hostile, yellow for uncertain, or green for
non-hostile. The threat level of an aircraft could change
at any time during a scenario and so participants were
instructed to regularly recheck the parameters of
already-classified aircraft in case their threat level
needed reassessment. The color of the dot representing
it only changed in accordance with the classification
assigned by the participant and thus provided no cue re-
garding the occurrence of critical changes.
Second, for all hostile aircraft, participants were
instructed to determine the level of threat immediacy
based on their temporal proximity from the ship. Partici-
pants added the parameter values for the time to closest
point of approach and the closest point of approach in
units of time to prioritize their actions. Threat immedi-
acy could be high (<15 s from hitting the ship), medium
(15–30 s), or low (>30 s). As they made their decision,participants had to click on the corresponding immedi-
acy button (1 to 3, respectively).
Third, because all hostile aircraft were programmed to
hit the ship, participants were instructed to defend the
ship against hostile tracks by launching an anti-aircraft
missile. In real life, of course, there would be many safe-
guards and intermediate steps before an aircraft could
be engaged; however, this was substantially simplified for
the purpose of our experiment and required participants
only to select the aircraft they wanted to neutralize and
then click on the “Engage” button to launch the missile.
The weapon was represented by a small white dot on
the radar screen. Only one anti-aircraft missile projectile
could be airborne at one time.
Finally, participants needed to be sensitive to changes
occurring in the operational space in addition to per-
forming the other three subtasks. Each aircraft, when
appearing on the radar screen, had a status that could be
either non-hostile or uncertain. Over the course of a sce-
nario, some aircraft could change their status from non-
hostile or uncertain to become hostile if they displayed
4–5 threatening cues. Such changes were considered
critical and required detection in order to avoid the hos-
tile aircraft attacking the frigate. All critical changes
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screen that is a change in the aircraft speed and/or dir-
ection. Selection could be made using the radar, or
CHEX if available. If no actions were made on a hostile
aircraft within 15 s (the minimal time delay between two
critical changes), the change was considered undetected.
Since the occurrence of a ship hit would not necessarily
indicate that a critical change had been missed (other
factors may contribute to ship hits), this was not used as
a criterion for change detection. There were also non-
critical changes that could be either: (1) a non-hostile or
an uncertain aircraft changing speed and/or direction;
(2) a non-hostile aircraft becoming uncertain; and (3) a
non-hostile aircraft becoming an uncertain and changing
speed and/or direction.
CHEX tool
In the CHEX condition, the tool was positioned to the
right of the radar screen (Fig. 2, Area 4). As in Smallman
and St. John (2003), the role of CHEX is to automatically
detect and permanently store every change that occurs
in the airspace. The apparition of change-related infor-
mation in the table was not accompanied by an auditory
alert. The table is separated into three sortable columns:
time, ID, and changing parameter(s). Each time a change
occurred (critical or not), CHEX logged all the modified
parameters, one below the other, with the corresponding
time, aircraft ID, and description. The next change was
logged at the top of the table and previous changes
moved towards the bottom of the table. Given the large
number of changes accumulated in the table, CHEX had
a scroll bar to allow participants to consult changes that
had occurred at the beginning of a scenario and were
therefore listed at the bottom of the table. The CHEX
automation is fixed as its functionalities cannot be
turned off by the operator and its table cannot be hidden
or minimized on the display. As all changes are logged
(critical and otherwise) and there is no further filtering
of this information, the role of CHEX is to aid informa-
tion acquisition rather than to provide any deeper ana-
lysis of the change. Participants can refer to CHEX at
any time to determine whether a particular aircraft has
undergone a certain type of change and when this
change happened. A dynamic visual linking intercon-
nects CHEX and the radar screen enabling the selection
of an aircraft on either display, which highlights infor-
mation relative to the selected aircraft in both displays.
Eye tracking
Eye movements were recorded with a Tobii T1750 eye
tracker at a sampling rate of 50 Hz. Participants were seated
in front of a computer monitor at a distance of 60 cm. In-
frared eye tracking cameras are integrated into this monitor
allowing participants to freely move their head. Eachfixation had to last at least 100 ms to be recorded by the
eye tracker and the fixation field corresponds to a 50-pixel
radius circle. The functional field of view of the participant
thus corresponds to a visual angle of approximately 2°. As
well as analyzing fixations in the AOIs illustrated in Figs. 1
and 2, we also assessed fixations on specific aircraft during
the 15 s following a change; that is, a fixation on a critically
changed aircraft during that time window would be classi-
fied as a fixated rather than a non-fixated change. A critical
change was considered fixated if the aircraft which under-
went the change (or the associated change entry in the tool
table when available) fell within 50 pixels of the center
point of a fixation at least once during the 15-s post-change
period and if this fixation lasted at least 100 ms.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were given
a short tutorial to familiarize themselves with the context
of the simulation and their tasks. This tutorial also in-
formed participants assigned to the CHEX condition about
the utility of the tool. After the instructions, they were re-
quired to perform the threat evaluation and immediacy
judgments from nine static screenshots to confirm their un-
derstanding of the tasks. They then familiarized themselves
with the microworld’s dynamic environment through two
training sessions which comprised four 3-min scenarios.
After calibrating the eye-tracking system, participants
performed four randomly presented experimental blocks
separated by 5-min rest periods. Each block comprised four
4-min scenarios of similar difficulty, presented randomly,
for a total of 64 min of experimental testing. Each test sce-
nario included a set of 27 aircraft (11 non-hostile, 8 uncer-
tain, and 8 hostile) varying in speed and trajectory on the
radar. A total of 33 changes occurred during a test scenario:
25 were non-critical and eight were critical. A maximum of
10 aircraft could appear on the radar screen at any one
time. Overall, a participant had to detect 128 critical
changes. After each scenario, participants answered two
questions aloud regarding the mental and temporal de-
mand indices from the NASA-TLX subjective workload
questionnaire: (1) “How much mental and perceptual activ-
ity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, look-
ing, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding,
simple or complex?” and (2) “How much time pressure did
you feel due to the rate or pace at which the task oc-
curred?” Participants indicated their perceived level of men-
tal load and time pressure on a Likert-type scale of 1–10.
Results and discussion
CHEX and control groups were compared according to
three aspects of operator activities: (1) change-detection
performance; (2) subjective mental workload; (3) usage
of CHEX; and (4) TEWA performance. The alpha level
was set at .05.
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Overall, 14.9% of critical changes were missed in the
CHEX group and 13.17% in the control group (Fig. 3a),
thus confirming the finding that complex, dynamic situ-
ations are vulnerable to CB (DiVita et al., 2004; Durlach
& Chen, 2003; Smallman & St. John, 2003; Vachon et al.,
2012). There was no significant difference in the number
of undetected changes between the two conditions,
t(49) = −1.040, P = 0.303, d = −0.29 (Fig. 3a), and simi-
larly, the speed of detection did not differ significantly
between groups, t(49) < 1 (Fig. 3b). These results indicate
that—contrary to the findings of St. John et al.
(2005)—CHEX failed to improve the detection of critical
changes in the airspace.
Fixated versus non-fixated undetected changes
The undetected changes were further examined accord-
ing to whether or not they had been fixated in the 15-s
post-change interval. Overall, the mean percentage of
critical changes that were fixated was 89.1% for the con-
trol condition and 88.3% for the CHEX condition. In
Fig. 4, we compared the rate of undetected changes that
were fixated with the changes that were missed and
non-fixated, for each condition, using a 2 (fixation: fix-
ated versus non-fixated) × 2 (condition: control versus
CHEX) mixed ANOVA. This analysis revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of fixation, F(1, 49) = 210.571, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.811, with a greater percentage of undetected
changes that were not fixated than were fixated (Fig. 4).
There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 49) = 1.207,
p = 0.277, η2p = 0.024, but more importantly, the inter-
action effect was significant F(1, 49) = 4.212, p = 0.045,
η2p = 0.079. Regarding non-fixated changes, simple effect
tests showed that there was no significant difference be-
tween the two conditions in terms of the percentage ofFig. 3 Mean percentage of undetected changes (panel a) and mean detec
bars represent 95% within-subject confident intervals calculated with Massochanges undetected (p = 0.120). However, the CHEX
condition produced a higher percentage of undetected
changes that were fixated than the control condition
(p = 0.003), thus CHEX increased the likelihood that a
change—although attended—could remain undetected.
Given that the addition of the CHEX table produced a
change in luminosity and contrast to the participants’
interface when compared to the interface of the control
condition—a difference that could affect pupil dilation—we
used dwell time on the changing aircraft for assessing atten-
tional processing during fixations instead of measuring the
pupil diameter (Poole & Ball, 2006). Critical changes that
had been fixated were then examined according to whether
or not they were detected, to verify the impact of CHEX on
dwell time on the changed aircraft (using the radar and/or
the tool) during the 15-s post-change interval (see Table 1).
A 2 (detection: detected versus undetected) × 2 (condition:
control versus CHEX) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant
effect of detection F(1, 49) = 226.612, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.822,
with greater dwell time on the radar screen and/or the
CHEX for detected changes compared to undetected
changes. The main effect of condition was also significant,
F(1, 49) = 8.637, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.15, showing that partici-
pants in the CHEX condition spent more time looking at
the changing aircraft on the radar and/or on the tool during
the 15-s post-change interval than participants assigned to
the control condition. Moreover, the ANOVA revealed a
significant interaction effect, F(1, 49) = 4.018, p = 0.05,
η2p = 0.076, with simple effect tests showing a signifi-
cant difference between the CHEX and control condi-
tion regarding the dwell time on changing aircraft for
undetected changes (p < 0.001), but not for detected
changes (p = 0.166). This indicates that both the presence
and the usage of CHEX is indeed responsible for the
higher number of attended changes that remainedtion speed (in ms; panel b) for the control and CHEX conditions. Error
n and Loftus’s (2003) method
Fig. 4 Mean percentage of undetected changes according to whether they were fixated or not for the control and CHEX conditions of
Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confident intervals calculated with Masson and Loftus’s (2003) method
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attention-failure source of CB (cf. Vachon et al., 2012).
During this complex and demanding task, the further
addition of the CHEX tool to the interface may have
exceeded participants’ attentional capacity, causing a tem-
porary breakdown in attentional processes and increasing
the likelihood that a critical change would be missed.
Subjective workload
Measures of subjective workload were taken using the
two subscales of the NASA-TLX. An independent-
samples t test revealed that the CHEX condition was
associated with a higher level of perceived mental load
(M: 7.17, SD: 1.29) when compared to that obtained in
the control condition (M: 6.29, SD: 1.30), t(49) = −2.405,
p = 0.020, d = −0.697. However, there was no significant
difference between the average level of time pressure re-
ported by participants assigned to the CHEX conditionTable 1 Dwell time (mean + SD) on changing aircraft using the
radar and/or the CHEX during 15-s post-change interval in
Experiment 1
Control condition CHEX condition
Using the radar (in ms)
Undetected changes 666.57 (264.07) 573.87 (253.6)
Detected changes 1667.93 (439.76) 1514.48 (465.33)
Using the tool (in ms)
Undetected changes N/A 524.17 (414.2)
Detected changes N/A 349.32 (369.82)
Total
Undetected changes 666.57 (264.07) 1098.03 (439.76)
Detected changes 1667.93 (439.76) 1863.84 (551.51)(M: 6.83, SD: 1.69) and that perceived by participants in
the control condition (M: 6.43, SD: 1.31), t(49) < 1. The
CHEX had a detrimental effect on subjective workload
as participants judged that their tasks were more de-
manding and complex and required more mental and
perceptual activities in the presence of the tool than in
its absence.
This suggests that participants placed in a multitasking
dynamic situation may not have been able to make full
sense of the change-related information contained in the
CHEX table due to limited cognitive resources, making
it less effective than in studies using a single-task envir-
onment. If, as suggested by Vachon et al. (2012), the ex-
traction of visual information can be momentarily
degraded by the high cognitive demands of the situation,
it is likely that the extraction of information logged in
CHEX suffers the same complications.
CHEX usage
Although the support tool failed to reduce the incidence
of CB, it is interesting to gauge the extent to which par-
ticipants may have thought that CHEX was helpful to
the task by assessing their usage. Table 2 shows that
usage of the DSS was sporadic; participants fixated on
the CHEX tool for just 2.42% of scenarios. Such an add-
itional information load in an already demanding con-
text may have prevented sufficient time or attentional
resources to attend properly to the supplementary tool,
explaining why CHEX was used only sporadically.
Because data were averaged across scenarios, it is pos-
sible that the “overall” sporadic use of CHEX may be
due to participants abandoning the tool during the
course of the experiment. To test this possibility, we
contrasted the three “usage” metrics across the four
Table 2 Behavioral and ocular metrics (mean + SD) of the CHEX
usability for Experiment 1 and 2
TEWA + CHEX Change detection
only + CHEX
Mean number of aircraft selections
On the tool 96.76 (91.23) 724 (765.813)
On the radar 679.8 (191.49) 1119.95 (1062.7)
Selections on the tool (%) 12.5 (11.55) 45.54 (45.63)
Eye movements on the tool
Overall dwell time (%) 2.42 (2.45) 11.5 (10.95)
Fixations (%) 3.92 (3.49) 28 (22.33)
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ANOVAs. A significant difference was observed across
test blocks in terms of the percentage of selections made
using CHEX, F(3, 72) = 2.897, p = 0.041, η2p = 0.108, as
selections seemed to increase between test 1 (M: 12.7%,
SD: 12.27%) and test 2 (M: 14.2%, SD: 12.71%) and
seemed to decrease and to remain the same in the last
two tests (M: 11.93, SD: 1123%; M: 11.26%, SD: 11.75%,
respectively). However, none of the multiple comparison
tests performed were significant. The results were more
clear cut for the other CHEX usage metrics: the percent-
age of fixations on the CHEX table did not change over
time, F(3, 72) = 1.47, p = 0.230, η2p = 0.058 (overall mean:
3.98%), nor the dwell time on the tool, F(3, 72) < 1 (over-
all mean: 23.19 s). These results indicate that CHEX was
used (sporadically) throughout the entire experiment.
TEWA performance
In line with our holistic assessment of CHEX, we
assessed performance on the TEWA subtasks, namelyFig. 5 Mean percentage of correct classifications (panel a) and ship hits (p
bars represent 95% within-subject confident intervals calculated with Massothreat evaluation (percentage of correct classifications)
and defensive effectiveness (percentage ship hits by a
hostile aircraft). According to an independent-samples t
test, there was no significant difference between the
average level of classification accuracy obtained in the
CHEX condition and that observed in the control condi-
tion, t(49) = 1.736, p = 0.089, d = 0.48 (Fig. 5a). However,
the presence of CHEX significantly increased the per-
centage of ship hits relative to the control condition
t(49) = −2.783, p = 0.008, d = −0.77 (see Fig. 5b). The
addition of CHEX to the original interface impaired
TEWA performance meaning that the own ship was
more vulnerable to hostile threats with this support tool
than without.
The increase in subjective workload in the CHEX con-
dition would seem to provide some explanation for the
associated decrease in TEWA performance in the pres-
ence of the tool. Such a result suggests that the presence
of the DSS on the display provided an additional source
of information to monitor that could have increased the
apparent cognitive load of the task (Perry, Wiggins,
Childs, & Fogarty, 2013). Indeed, introducing a table list-
ing all the changes (critical and non-critical) occurring
in the complex dynamic situation increased the amount
of visual information to process before making a deci-
sion. It has also been shown that the mere presence of a
tool or modifying a part of an interface can change
the way a task is performed when compared to that
observed beforehand (McCrickard, Catrambone, Che-
war, & Stasko, 2003; Rousseau, Tremblay, Lafond,
Vachon, & Breton, 2007). Therefore, this extra burden
and pressure that the addition of CHEX put on par-
ticipants may have affected their efficacy in making
precise and timely decisions with regard to weaponanel b) for the control and CHEX conditions of Experiment 1. Errors
n and Loftus’s (2003) method
Vallières et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:32 Page 11 of 20assignment, thus leaving the own ship more exposed
to attack (ship hits).Experiment 2
The finding that CHEX did not improve change detec-
tion in our task would seem to be at odds with the work
of St. John et al. (2005) which demonstrated a clear re-
duction in CB with CHEX. Although both our study and
that of St. John, Smallman, and Manes used dynamic,
complex, and fairly realistic air-warfare microworlds, we
suggest that the discrepancy may lie with the general
task demands placed upon participants in each context;
that is, whether detecting changes was the only task to
perform or whether it formed part of a more complex,
higher-order task. In Experiment 2, to test this hypoth-
esis, we modified the S-CCS interface to remove ele-
ments associated with the TEWA task and participants’
only requirement was to identify critical changes that
were associated with a classification change in the threat
level of an aircraft. If CHEX improved change detection
in this modified S-CCS context, thus replicating the re-
sults of St. John, Smallman, and Manes, it would suggest
that the ability of CHEX to reduce CB is dependent
upon the wider task requirements. The CHEX external
aid was the same in Experiment 2 as that in Experiment
1, and participants used the information provided by the
tool in the same manner in both experimental settings,
for detecting and identifying critical changes.Fig. 6 S-CCS display in the control condition of Experiment 2. Arrows point
order to adapt the interface to the context in which change detection wasMethod
Participants
Thirty-nine students from Université Laval took part: 20
were assigned to the control condition (10 men; mean
age, 24.5 years) and the others were assigned to the CHEX
condition (9 men; mean age, 26.3 years). None had taken
part in Experiment 1.Task
Experiment 2 used the same microworld as previously,
but with the difference that participants performed only
one task: a change-detection task whereby they had to
press a “Detection” button (see Fig. 6) as soon as they
detected a critical change, that is, when an aircraft
changed from a non-threatening (i.e. non-hostile or un-
certain) to a threatening (i.e. hostile) status. Although
participants had to select an aircraft and refer to the
“threat” parameter of the list (see Fig. 6) to verify its
status, each critical change was accompanied by a
change in the speed and/or direction of that aircraft
visible on the radar screen, as in the previous experi-
ment. When pressing the “Detection” button, the white
dot representing the aircraft then turned red and corre-
sponding lines in CHEX, when available, turned gray.
This was done to help participants to keep track of
which critical changes they had already detected and
reported. There were again eight critical changes per
scenario.to the changes made to the parameter list and action buttons in
the only task to perform
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ally clicking on the “Detection” button as soon as
they saw a “hostile” status in the parameter list and
thus to focus only on changing—newly hostile—air-
craft, two hostile aircraft acting as false alarms were
present on the radar screen at the beginning of each
experimental scenario. The dot representing these
hostile aircraft was white as for all other aircraft
appearing on the radar. Participants were aware of
these “non-changing” hostile aircraft and therefore
knew that the presence of a hostile aircraft did not
automatically imply a critical change to the situation.
Participants were asked not to detect and report these
non-changing hostiles and to focus exclusively on
new threats. When participants noticed a change in
direction and/or speed, they had to select the associ-
ated aircraft and verify the threat parameter to deter-
mine whether it constituted a critical change (i.e. a
change from a non-threatening to a hostile status) or
not (i.e. the aircraft was not hostile or had been hos-
tile since the beginning of the scenario).Microworld
The microworld was identical to that used in previous
experiments, except for the following features. As shown
in Fig. 6, the attribute “threat,” which designates the ac-
tual threat level of the selected aircraft, was added to the
parameter list. This was because participants still had to
detect changes in aircraft status—i.e. notice new hostile
aircraft—but were no longer required to classify the air-
craft appearing on the radar. Aircraft classification was
thus performed by the computer and the result of this
classification was provided to participants through the
“threat” parameter. Therefore, participants had to detect
status changes based on visual cues (i.e. change in
speed/direction) and/or CHEX (when available) and de-
termine whether these changes were critical or not using
the “threat” parameter. The remaining parameters were
now irrelevant to the task. The “Detection” button re-
placed the “Engage” button which, in previous experi-
ments, was used to launch anti-aircraft missiles. This
button allowed participants to explicitly report the crit-
ical changes. The immediacy and classification buttons
were also removed from the interface as change detec-
tion was now the sole task to perform. In the control
condition (see Fig. 6), participants performed change de-
tection with no additional support whereas in the CHEX
condition (see Fig. 7), participants had access to CHEX.Results and discussion
Overall change detection
As shown in Fig. 8a, the percentage of undetected
changes1 was significantly higher in the controlcondition than when CHEX was available, t(37) =
4.945, p < 0.001, d = 1.596. Participants were also sig-
nificantly faster to detect critical changes in the
CHEX condition than in the control condition, t(37)
= 2.059, p = 0.047, d = 0.66 (see Fig. 8b). In line with
previous findings by St. John et al. (2005), CHEX can
greatly improve change detection when this is the only
task to perform. In such a context, CHEX becomes a
powerful tool to reduce CB.
Fixated versus non-fixated undetected changes
Overall, the mean percentage of critical changes that
were fixated was 90.6% for the control condition and
89.9% for the CHEX condition. As for Experiment 1,
the rate of detection failures for fixated and non-fixated
changes was computed separately and then analyzed
using a split plot 2 × 2 ANOVA (fixation × conditions).
Three participants in the CHEX condition were re-
moved from the analysis as they fixated all the critical
changes and so would have been considered as missing
data. The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of
fixation, F(1, 34) = 84.219, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.712, and of
condition, F(1, 34) = 35.345, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.510 (see
Fig. 9). More importantly, we obtained a significant
two-way interaction, F(1, 34) = 19.447, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.364. This interaction arose because, while there were
fewer undetected changes that were fixated than not,
this difference was significantly attenuated in the pres-
ence of CHEX relative to the control condition (p <
0.001). When change detection was the only task to
perform, CHEX was successful in reducing both
sources of CB, particularly those changes that were
missed because they were never attended.
Critical changes that had been fixated were then ex-
amined according to whether or not they were de-
tected, to verify the impact of CHEX on dwell time on
the changed aircraft (using the radar and/or the tool)
during the 15-s post-change interval (see Table 3). Five
participants were removed from the analysis as they de-
tected all the critical changes that they fixated and so
would have been considered as missing data. A 2 (de-
tection: detected versus undetected) × 2 (condition:
control versus CHEX) mixed ANOVA indicated that
there was no main effect of detection, F(1, 32) = 1.781,
p = 0.191, η2p = 0.053, nor interaction effect, F(1, 32) <
1. However, the analysis revealed a significant effect of
condition, F(1, 32) = 9.970, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.238. Partici-
pants assigned to the CHEX condition spent more time
looking at the changing aircraft on the radar screen
and/or on the tool during the 15-s post-change interval
than participants in the control condition. As shown in
Table 3, in the CHEX condition, participants spent the
vast majority of the 15-s post-change intervals fixating
the CHEX tool rather the radar display. In the change-
Fig. 7 S-CCS display in the CHEX condition of Experiment 2
Vallières et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:32 Page 13 of 20detection-only context, it is clear that adding the CHEX
log to the interface allowed the participants to spend
more time analyzing the changing objects, which
helped them to successfully detect the great majority of
critical changes.Fig. 8 Mean percentage of undetected changes (panel a) and mean detec
bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals calculated with MasSubjective workload
With CHEX support, participants reported significantly
lower levels of mental load (M: 6.02, SD: 2.13), t(36) =
2.038, p = 0.049, d = 0.661, and time pressure (M: 5.07,
SD: 1.75), t(36) = 2.079, p = 0.045, d = 0.675, than withouttion speed (in ms; panel b) in each condition of Experiment 2. Error
son and Loftus’s (2003) method
Fig. 9 Results from Experiment 2: mean percentage of undetected changes according to whether they were fixated or not for the control and
CHEX conditions. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confident intervals calculated with Masson and Loftus’s (2003) method
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spectively). It thus appears that, contrary to Experiment 1,
CHEX can help to reduce subjective workload but only
when this is the only task to perform. In such cases, the
operator has available attentional capacity to be able to
use the tool to their advantage; with the knowledge
that changes are automatically logged in a table, per-
ceptions of pressure and mental load are decreased
because participants know they can always refer to
the permanent record of CHEX to supplement what
they see on the radar.
CHEX usage
As shown in Table 2, when change detection was the sole
task, participants made significantly more aircraft selections
using CHEX than when change detection was embedded
within the TEWA task (Experiment 1), t(42) = −3.493,
p = 0.001, d = −0.994. In Experiment 2, participants
spent 11.5% of the experiment duration fixating CHEX,
which is significantly higher than that in the CHEX condi-
tion of Experiment 1 (2.42%), t(42) = −3.563, p = 0.002,
d = −1.149.
We performed repeated-measures ANOVAs on all
“usage” metrics and found the percentage of selections
using CHEX varied over time, F(3, 54) = 5.486, p = 0.022,
ηp
2 = 0.234. The average percentage of selections using
the CHEX was 41.59% (SD: 42.38%) for test 1, 46.62%
(SD: 46.71%) for test 2, 47.29% (47.31%) for test 3, and
47.84% (SD: 47.88%) for test 4. Even though none of the
multiple comparisons tests performed were significant, a
trend analysis shows that the percentage of selections
using CHEX increased linearly across the four test sce-
narios, F(1, 18) = 6.286, p = 0.022, ηp
2 = 0.259, suggesting
that participants began to see the benefit in using thetool the more they became familiar with it. Dwell time
on CHEX, F(3, 54) = 1.477, p = 0.231, ηp
2 = 0.076 (overall
mean: 117.71 s), and percentage of fixations on the tool
(F < 1; (overall mean: 27.35%) remained the same
over time.
General discussion
The objective of the present study was to test whether the
efficacy of CHEX in supporting situation awareness main-
tenance could generalize to a context in which situational
change detection served the higher goals of a primary task
that comprised three other subtasks. However, far from
supporting participants, results from Experiment 1
showed that CHEX increased the attentional source of
CB, reduced defensive effectiveness, and led to higher
levels of perceived mental workload. The success of a
CHEX-like tool in augmenting change detection thus
seems to depend very much upon the task in which it is
used. Indeed, in line with the findings of St. John et al.
(2005), CHEX was able to reduce CB within our naval air-
warfare simulation when the detection of critical changes
was the only task to perform (Experiment 2). In these cir-
cumstances CHEX can provide a useful log of changes to
augment cognition and facilitate cross-referencing with
the radar display.
We acknowledge that, with the introduction of a
change-detection tool to the interface, the radar size var-
ied across the two conditions of both experiments and
may have impacted performance. However, even though
in the CHEX condition the spacing between radar ob-
jects was slightly smaller than that observed in the con-
trol condition, the aircraft icon size remained the same
and critical changes were always accompanied by the
same visible change of speed and/or direction on the
Table 3 Dwell time (mean + SD) on changing aircraft using the
radar and/or the CHEX during 15-s post-change interval in
Experiment 2
Control condition CHEX condition
Using the radar (in ms)
Undetected changes 1154.32 (525.16) 275.74 (368.55)
Detected changes 1618.65 (457.36) 953.71 (416.81)
Using the tool (in ms)
Undetected changes N/A 2683.89 (2863.59)
Detected changes N/A 2101.43 (2071.62)
Total
Undetected changes 1154.32 (525.16) 2959.63 (2794.41)
Detected changes 1618.65 (457.36) 3055.14 (1987.58)
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cal and aircraft were never occluded by another object.
Therefore, we are confident that any impact of variations
in radar size would have been negligible.
One recent model of attention behavior, NSEEV
(noticing – salience, effort, expectancy, value; Steelman,
McCarley, & Wickens, 2011; Wickens et al., 2009), can
provide a useful theoretical basis for the current work
on change detection. This model predicts scanning and
noticing behaviors in a dynamic visual workspace by
combining bottom-up factors of attentional control (e.g.
the salience of a target) and top-down factors (e.g. the
expectancy of an event occurring in a particular location,
and the value or criticality of that information) and the
effort needed to shift attention towards that item (eccen-
tricity from current point of gaze). More recent work on
the NSEEV emphasized on the interactions between sali-
ence, expectancy, and eccentricity in alert detection. Ec-
centricity includes factors pertaining to the target
location within the visual scene, such as the acuity loss
in the peripheral vision and the effort needed to direct
attention towards the different regions of the scene, to
explain increasing reaction times and error rates as a
function of the distance between the target location and
the gaze location of the participant. Steelman, McCarley,
and Wickens (2013) showed that visual alerts appearing
in low-probability locations not only were associated
with poorer detection performance, but exacerbated the
negative impacts of low-salience and eccentric targets.
We consider how features of this model might explain
noticing behavior in the current task and thus the extent
to which CHEX hindered change detection rates under
multitasking conditions.
CHEX and sources of CB
The pre-attentive source of CB occurs when the partici-
pant never looks at the change (failure to direct atten-
tion towards a change; e.g. Henderson & Hollingworth,2003; O’Regan et al., 2000; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons
& Ambinder, 2005). On a large display featuring numer-
ous aircraft on the radar, as well as a list of associated
parameters, shifting attention between all areas of the
screen can be effortful and items or events that are fur-
ther away from the point of gaze are more likely to be
missed (one factor of the eccentricity parameter of
NSEEV; Steelman et al., 2011, 2013). Despite having an
additional area of interest on the display in the case of
the CHEX condition—which could have increased the
chance that participants were looking in the wrong place
at the wrong time—fixations on the tool were minimal
and there appeared to be no difference between condi-
tions in terms of changes missed because attention was
directed elsewhere.
Directed attention is required for change detection, but
it is not always sufficient (see Simons & Rensink, 2005;
Beck et al., 2007); changes may also be missed due to a
failure of attentional processes (Privitera, Renninger, Car-
ney, Klein, & Aguilar, 2010; Vachon et al., 2012). Accord-
ing to this second source of CB, missing changes can
result from a failure in selection the objects to encode in
memory, making sense of the changes, or in making the
appropriate action after the changes. Registering a change
requires a mental comparison with that object’s previous
state and in the current task, recollection and comparison
of subtle changes in a dynamic rather than a static attri-
bute may be particularly demanding (e.g. a change in
speed of an already moving object). In the NSEEV model,
the salience of the target is influenced by both static fea-
tures (contrast of the item of interest and the environ-
ment; see Itti & Koch, 2000) and dynamic or motion
features (moment-to-moment changes of static salience;
see Loy, Xiang, & Gong, 2012; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). In-
deed, the current task may be particularly vulnerable to
CB in general, as there are no salient static or dynamic
features that distinguish a critically changed aircraft from
any other on the radar screen in any of the two conditions.
This concurs with the higher dwell time on the changing
objects during the post-change interval for unnoticed
changes in the CHEX condition than in the control condi-
tion of Experiment 1. Participants devoted a greater
amount of attentional resources in the attempt to extract,
compare, and comprehend the change-related contextual
cues displayed by the radar and the tool, but failed to con-
sciously detect the attended changes.
The NSEEV model also suggests that the size of the
functional field of view narrows under conditions of
high workload, meaning that the current task—likely to
require a broad attentional breadth in order to register
the necessary dynamic changes, as well as perform the
TEWA task consecutively—may be particularly vulner-
able to increases in workload. The CHEX condition in-
troduces a higher visual load, resulting in impaired
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keeps a permanent list of every change (critical and non-
critical) that has occurred as well as numerous attributes
associated with it. This serves to increase the amount of
information on the screen, but fails to improve the sali-
ence of the most important information as critical and
non-critical changes are not distinguished from each
other. Although use of the tool was sporadic, occasional
monitoring of the changes list may have created a more
demanding divided attention condition whereby partici-
pants intermittently shifted attention towards the clut-
tered table to check if important information might be
gleaned from it (Rosenholtz, Li, Mansfield, & Jin, 2006).
Moreover, the mere presence of CHEX on the screen
may have increased workload through an overhead cog-
nitive cost in deciding when—or indeed whether—to
shift attention to the automated tool. This high workload
combination (CHEX plus TEWA task) means that atten-
tional focus is narrowed and reduces the probability that
sufficient attention can be directed at a change in order
to detect it (Perry et al., 2013).
In Experiment 2, the replica of the original CHEX then
proved a useful support tool in reducing both types of CB.
In a complex dynamic task situation, attention can often
be directed towards other areas of the interface leading
critical changes to sometimes go unnoticed as the more
eccentric the changes occur from the participant’s point of
gaze, the more the peripheral vision is degraded. CHEX
permanent repository of changes can help to compensate
for those momentary lapses of attention. When operator
capacity allows, participants can then rely on CHEX to re-
deploy attention to the information they need in order to
report an initially undetected change. Importantly in this
single-task rather than multitask environment, CHEX was
also able to reduce the attentional source of CB relative to
No-DSS: since the tool allowed for offloading—rather than
detrimentally overloading—cognitive processes needed for
extracting, comparing, and understanding the evolution of
the situation, participants were better able to answer the
calls for attention demanded by the critical changes. The
high-load context of Experiment 1 likely narrowed atten-
tional breadth (narrowing of functional field of view)
making the detection of fixated dynamic changes more
difficult thus compromising the ability to register, extract,
and comprehend dynamic change information. In
Experiment 2 however, CHEX actually reduced workload
and so a broader attentional breadth may have better
allowed for the processing of change-related information
when a critically changed aircraft was fixated. Future work
should apply the computational capacity of the NSEEV
model to predict the detection rates in both with and
without CHEX conditions of this study in order to con-
firm the influence of the bottom-up and top-down factors
in the inefficacy of CHEX.TEWA task performance
The mere presence of CHEX on the S-CCS interface
was enough to disrupt TEWA performance. It is possible
that while cognitive resources were devoted to carrying
out unnecessary actions such as crosschecking the ver-
acity of a change notified by CHEX, an insufficient
amount of resources were allocated to the other TEWA
subtasks which might have resulted in scheduling im-
pairment (Dixon & Wickens, 2006). As shown by several
studies, the simple modification of a part of an interface
can change information seeking and eye movement be-
haviors, as well as decision-making processes, and there-
fore can modulate how a task is performed (McCrickard
et al., 2003; Rousseau et al., 2007). In accordance with
this finding, modifying the S-CCS interface by introdu-
cing CHEX could have been enough to change the way
participants conducted TEWA, hence leading to poorer
defensive effectiveness.
Sporadic use of CHEX
Because usage of CHEX did not vary over time, its spor-
adic use cannot be attributed to a lack of training with
the tool—whereby one would have expected usage to in-
crease with familiarity across the 88 min experiment—
or to participants’ mistrust in CHEX automation
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), whereby usage might
have decreased given the number of non-critical or
‘false alarm’ changes logged in the table creating a
sense of unreliability (a cry-wolf effect; Brenitz 1983;
Wickens et al., 2009b). More likely is that given the high
cognitive workload imposed by the concurrent TEWA
subtasks (Experiment 1) and the fact that making sense of
the table required quite an investment in time and re-
sources, participants lacked the necessary cognitive re-
sources to devote to the tool consistently over the whole
course of the experiment (Wickens, 2002). There may
have been a feeling that by devoting too much time to the
table, they would miss key information displayed on other
critical areas of the interface (e.g. radar) that was necessary
to perform the TEWA activities. On the other hand, in a
single-task context (Experiment 2), usage of CHEX was
greater as more cognitive resources were available for pro-
cessing and understanding critical change-information
from the CHEX table.
The NSEEV model parameters could also shed light
on the disuse of the tools, in the way that participants
do not want to invest the effort (eccentricity) in shifting
attention to the right-hand side of the screen, when the
information they are using to perform the TEWA task
can be found centrally or on the left-hand side (radar
screen and parameters list). The NSEEV model discour-
ages large attentional shifts by including a spatial filter
that reduces the salience of peripheral stimuli and there-
fore mimics the inhibitory properties of effort and poor
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rameters lists are essential for the focal task of TEWA,
CHEX is perhaps seen as an optional addition that is too
effortful to process under these high-load conditions and
so participants rarely shift their attention towards it.
Moreover, participants might have privileged the radar
screen when searching for a critical change as they were
expecting to notice it more easily in this part of the
interface rather than in the CHEX table. The combin-
ation of the high eccentricity and the low expectancy as-
sociated with the CHEX tool might explain the sporadic
use of the CHEX. Indeed, in Experiment 2 when change
detection was the only task to perform, there was less
emphasis on the parameters list on the left-hand side of
the screen, so participants could devote more time to
the tool on the right-hand side without requiring long
effortful attentional reallocation between the two. The
longer dwell times over the CHEX table show that
participants expected to find critical changes using
the tool.
NSEEV also emphasizes the importance of value (or
task-relevancy and priority) of the information displayed
in the different portions of an interface in determining
the likelihood of change detection and participants may
consider certain areas of the screen to be more useful
for change detection than others (Horrey, Wickens, &
Consalus, 2006). It is possible that the value of the
CHEX table was lower when it was used within the mul-
titasking context as it was relevant and directly useful to
only one subtask. Participants might have prioritized the
use of the radar and the parameters list as they were
relevant for all their subtasks. Their propensity to
“neglect” CHEX may have also been amplified by their
subjective tendency to rely on tools that maintain the
high-fidelity spatio-temporal realism of the visual scene
(naïve realism; Smallman & St. John, 2005), preventing
them from considering the true utility of CHEX to help
perform their task. Indeed, the transposition of the
events occurring in the situation into verbal entries dis-
played in the cluttered CHEX table may have been less
appealing or less valuable for change detection than pre-
senting them over a geospatial display. Participants may
have believed that any critical changes would be more
easily apparent and detected on the radar that displays
speed/direction information dynamically, than by sorting
through a list of written information. In Experiment 2,
given that the focus was solely on change detection and
not on the performance of other subtasks, participants
may have placed a higher level of value on the change
detection tool provided for them specifically to facilitate
the task and thus usage was higher. Participants’ judg-
ment of where the most useful information could be
gleaned from would have influenced their gaze
behavior.Solutions for preventing CB
The NSEEV model can guide us towards a number of
ways to prevent CB. Increasing the salience of critical
changes is a fundamental step (see Loy et al., 2012;
Zhang, Yuan, Zheng, Sheng, & Liu, 2010): given that
CHEX stores change-related information for all objects
in a dynamic situation, the table can rapidly become
cluttered (Rosenholtz et al., 2006). The design could per-
haps benefit from the implementation of an algorithm
that would prioritize key information (see St. John et al.,
2005). Instead of the default chronological ordering, an
algorithm could process visual objects in such a way that
the most important changes would be displayed at the
top and those less important would appear at the bot-
tom of the table (see Yeh & Wickens, 2001) or the level
of importance could be varied through color intensity
(see St. John et al., 2005b) to further increase the static
salience of critical changes. A prioritization algorithm
could reduce the negative impact of this clutter by enab-
ling more effective filtering of critical from non-critical
information (see Carver & Turoff, 2007; Hegarty, 2011),
decreasing the saliency of entries less likely to be critical
(see Wickens, Ambinder, & Alexander, 2004) and thus
increasing the value of the information held in the table.
However, any form of automatic prioritization could also
generate errors. Current technology is not able to
achieve a perfect hit rate (e.g. all critical changes are de-
tected and correctly ordered) and false positives could
not be completely avoided (Thomas & Rantanen, 2006).
Automated prioritization systems, optimal or not, are
also prone to the well-known risks of automation such
as operator mistrust and overreliance (see Parasuraman,
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
NSEEV predicts that detection of an event is related to
the eccentricity of the target location in the visual scene.
One potential solution then would be to integrate the
real-time change tracking functionality within the radar
view rather than adding a separate tool on the display
(see Loy et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2010). This would re-
duce the need for shifting gaze across a wide area and
for moving the focus of attention across very different
display formats (see Athènes, Chatty, & Bustico, 2000).
Given the inefficacy of an external aid in the current
multitasking context, radar-integrated notification sys-
tems should be tested in future studies. Indeed, such sys-
tems may seem intuitively more appealing and valuable
to operators as they believe they are more likely to
notice changes when presented with a dynamic spatial
display than a written list. Having this naïve realism
would perhaps mean the operator assigning more value
to the radar-integrated change-tracking tool than a list
of changes and so events may be more easily detected.
In air-traffic control, visual notifications to aircraft that
require an immediate response from the controller can
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These notifications are visual alerts to single critical
events whereas the CHEX tool stores and displays a list
of changes to all objects that may require a response.
Whether an alert-like notification or a change history
table is best suited depends on the nature of the task, its
tempo (frequency of non-critical and critical events),
and also on the level of discriminability and reliability of
the filtering algorithm-based system.
Conclusion
The current study suggests that decision aids for use in
multitasking contexts must be designed to fit within the
available workload capacity of the user and the timeli-
ness of the situation so that they may truly augment
cognition. Here we provide a demonstration that some-
times a system designed to help a specific users’ cogni-
tive function can also backfire and have unintended
consequences such as decision-making errors (Trafton
& Ratwani, 2014). By providing a comprehensive cogni-
tive assessment of the support system, we clearly show
that changing the nature and the demands of a dynamic
decision-making task made a tool—proven effective to
prevent CB within a change-detection-only task environ-
ment—ineffective once used in a multitasking context.
The efficacy of CHEX did not generalize to an environ-
ment that replicates the multitasking conditions and the
attentional demands of real C2 operations often ob-
served in air traffic control, surface warfare and security
surveillance. In relation to the CB phenomenon, it is
clear that its rate of occurrence is likely to be very high
in dynamic real-life monitoring tasks and that cognitive
support to prevent this problem still remains to be de-
veloped and validated.
Moreover, the current study provides further empirical
evidence of the existence of two sources of CB as previ-
ously shown by Vachon et al. (2012). Therefore, the
evaluation of a change-detection support system could
involve a test of its efficacy to prevent both sources of
CB by employing eye tracking. An efficient change-
detection tool must not only be able to help an operator
detect changes, but also identify and understand them,
while limiting the cost in attentional resources needed
to process the information it provides, especially in such
contexts that operators’ cognitive resources are already
overburdened.
Endnote
1Although participants in Experiment 2 had only to
perform change detection, the percentage of undetected
changes observed in the control condition was never-
theless much higher than in the control condition of
Experiment 1. Such a counterintuitive finding may have
arisen from an underestimation of the percentage ofundetected changes in the previous experiment. Indeed,
when change detection was embedded within the TEWA
task, correct detections were indexed by the timely ac-
tions made on the changed aircraft. It is thus possible in
such a context that some changes never perceived by
the participants were nonetheless recorded as detected
because participants selected within the 15-s post-
change period the changed aircraft on the basis of the
requirements of the other subtasks they had to perform
(and not because they had truly noticed the change).
Such an underestimation is impossible when change
detection is the sole task to perform.
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